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Abstract
A recent advance in our understanding of repeated PDs is the detection of a
threshold δ? at which laboratory subjects start to cooperate predictively. This
threshold is substantially above the classic threshold “existence of Grim equi-
librium” and has been characterized axiomatically by Blonski, Ockenfels, and
Spagnolo (2011, BOS). In this paper, I derive its behavioral foundations. First,
I show that the threshold is equivalent to existence of a “Semi-Grim” equi-
librium σcc > σcd = σdc > σdd . It is cooperative (σcc > 0.5), non-reciprocal
(σcd = σdc), and robust to imperfect monitoring (“belief-free”). Next, I show
that the no-reciprocity condition σcd = σdc also follows from robustness to
random-utility perturbations (logit equilibrium). Finally, I re-analyze strategies
in four recent experiments and find that the majority of subjects indeed plays
Semi-Grim when it is an equilibrium strategy, which explains δ?’s predictive
success.
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1 Introduction
The infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma has received much interest in economic
research. It is a proto-typical model of cooperation between self-interested agents,
but it is notoriously resistant to equilibrium refinement, which severely obstructs re-
liable predictions. Early experimental work, e.g. Rapoport and Mowshowitz (1966),
showed that subjects indeed cooperate, and the results of Axelrod (1980a,b) show
that tit-for-tat (TFT) is a theoretically successful strategy in response to opponents
with unknown strategies. However, TFT is an not a subgame-perfect equilibrium,
and the related “perfect tit-for-tat” (PTFT) strategy (σcc,σcd,σdc,σdd)= (1,0,0,1),1
which tends to be even more effective in response to cooperative strategies (Nowak
et al., 1993; Imhof et al., 2007), exists only under the strict condition that one round
of punishment suffices to deter defection. Experimental research has shown that
subjects cooperate robustly even if one round of punishment does not suffice and
that σdd ≈ 0 actually holds on average (see e.g. Table 1). Thus, only few, if any,
subjects seem to play PTFT, and existence of PTFT equilibrium is not necessary for
cooperation to be sustained in laboratory experiments.
In turn, existence of the Grim equilibrium (1,0,0,0) is not sufficient for co-
operation to be sustained (Dal Bo, 2005), and overall, puzzling strategy estimates
such as (σcc,σcd,σdc,σdd) = (0.81,0.43,0.37,0.22) by Rapoport and Mowshowitz
(1966), which relates to neither Grim, TFT, nor PTFT, suggested that cooperation
between human players is as fuzzy a concept as predicted by Folk theorems (see
e.g. Stahl et al., 1991). Surprisingly, however, cooperation between human play-
ers is not fuzzy, as two recent studies, Blonski et al. (2011, BOS) and Dal Bo and
Fréchette (2011), showed. They analyzed play in a large variety of experimental
treatments, and both concluded that the δ?-criterion defined axiomatically by BOS
is a predictive threshold for cooperation. In addition, the puzzling strategy relation
σcc > σdc ≈ σcd > σdd of Rapoport and Mowshowitz (1966) can be found implicitly
in the binary regression models of Bruttel and Kamecke (2012, Table 4), where it
obtains for three ways of eliciting strategies (hot play, strategy method, and a Moore
1σs′,s′′ is the probability of cooperation if one’s previous choice was s′ ∈ {c,d} and the opponent’s
choice was s′′ ∈ {c,d}
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Table 1: On average, σcc > σdc ≈ σcd > σdd obtains in most treatments of four recent experiments, and individually, at least
50% play Semi-Grim in treatments where Semi-Grim MPEs exist (otherwise, the Semi-Grim share is zero).
Standard. parameters Average behavior Share Individual classification (Section 5)
Treatment b a δ σˆcc σˆdc σˆcd σˆdd σˆcc > 0.25 Alw-Def Grim Semi-G TFT
Blonski et al. (2011)
1 3 2 0.75 0.902  0.288 < 0.399  0.02 0.475 0.31 0.14 0.52 0.03
2 1.25 1.12 0.75 1  0.333 ≈ 0.238  0.003 0.075 0 0.7 0 0.3
3 2.5 1.5 0.5 0.917  0.19 ≈ 0.095  0.011 0.3 1 0 0 0
4 2.5 1.5 0.75 0.947  0.188 ≈ 0.211  0.027 0.333 0.54 0.24 0 0.21
5 2.5 1.5 0.875 0.989  0.282 ≈ 0.323  0.026 0.525 0.29 0 0.59 0.12
6 1.43 1.29 0.5 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0.118 ≈ 0.007 0 0.8 0.2 0 0
7 1.43 1.29 0.75 0.977  0.372 ≈ 0.279  0.004 0.2 0 0.46 0.54 0
8 1.43 1.29 0.875 0.967  0.205 ≈ 0.289  0.017 0.4 0.4 0 0.6 0
9 2.4 1.8 0.75 0.927  0.196 ≈ 0.196  0.021 0.7 0.22 0.31 0.47 0
10 4.67 3 0.75 0.88  0.277 ≈ 0.192  0.042 0.725 0.17 0 0.73 0.1
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)
1 2.92 1.54 0.5 0.665  0.46  0.252  0.037 0.364 1 0 0 0
2 2.92 1.54 0.75 0.732  0.384 ≈ 0.406  0.057 0.682 0.47 0.15 0 0.38
3 2.92 2.15 0.5 0.553  0.273 ≈ 0.316  0.092 0.5 0.45 0.17 0 0.37
4 2.92 2.15 0.75 0.927  0.51 ≈ 0.443  0.124 0.921 0.08 0 0.87 0.06
5 2.92 2.77 0.5 0.828  0.227  0.431  0.074 0.696 0.35 0 0.52 0.13
6 2.92 2.77 0.75 0.943  0.311 ≈ 0.383  0.146 1 0 0 0.85 0.15
Duffy and Ochs (2009), “random rematching” treatment
3 2 0.9 0.964  0.36 ≈ 0.337  0.11 0.929 0 0 0.89 0.11
Fudenberg et al. (2012), treatments 1–5 are “noisy” PDs (actions are perturbed), treatment 6 is “no-noise”
1 2.5 1.5 0.875 0.842  0.33  0.245  0.064 0.833
2 3 2 0.875 0.872  0.417 ≈ 0.42  0.108 0.885
3 3.5 2.5 0.875 0.887  0.513 ≈ 0.473  0.161 0.875
4 5 4 0.875 0.911  0.453 ≈ 0.469  0.159 0.8
5 5 4 0.875 0.93  0.602 ≈ 0.664  0.252 0.948
6 5 4 0.875 0.971  0.425 ≈ 0.5  0.074 0.917 0 0 0.61 0.39
Note: The payoff parameters are standardized to be of the same form as the PD in Fig. 1b. σˆcc, σˆcd , σˆdc, σˆdd are the relative frequencies of cooperation in the four
states (across the all subjects, not counting the first rounds of each game). The relation signs indicate the p-values of Fisher tests on these relative frequencies
(“,” indicate α< .01, “>,<” indicate α< .05, and “≈” indicate insignificance). The relative frequencies of σcd,dc have been pooled in tests against either
σcc or σdd (as σcd ,σdc mostly do not differ significantly).
Individual classification: The population weights of the various strategies preview the estimation results of Section 5. Shares of inexistent or insignificant
components are set to zero. Always Defect is (σcc,σcd ,σdc,σdd) = (0,0,0,0) and Grim is (1,0,0,0). Tit-for-tat classification contains TFT itself (1,0,1,0),
“weak” perfect TFT (1,0,0,0.5), and Always-Cooperate (1,1,1,1); below, their shares are also reported separately. Semi-Grim contains regular Semi-Grim
≈ (1,0.3,0.3,0) and belief-free Semi-Grim ≈ (0.9,0.5,0.5,0.1); both as defined below (the actual frequencies depend on the treatment parameters).
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procedure following Engle-Warnick and Slonim, 2004, 2006), and similarly in many
more experiments—although it had never been reported anymore. To examine its
generality, I re-analyzed behavior in four recent experiments, and Table 1 shows that
the average strategy satisfies σcc > σdc = σcd > σdd in most treatments, including
Prisoner’s Dilemmas with exogenous noise. These results show that reliable point
predictions concerning strategies and cooperation actually are possible, but since
σcc > σdc = σcd > σdd does not relate to a known strategy and δ? has been defined
by means of axioms on the set of games rather than the set of strategies (see Def. 2.1
below), it is unclear whether these findings admit a behavioral interpretation.
The present paper extends this work in two ways. First, I show that the BOS ax-
ioms are equivalent to existence of what I propose to call “Semi-Grim” equilibrium,
and the Semi-Grim strategy is indeed the puzzling construct σcc > σdc = σcd > σdd
observed by Rapoport and Mowshowitz (1966) and in Table 1. Second, I show in a
latent class analysis (the results of which are previewed in Table 1) that the Semi-
Grim strategy is played by the majority of subjects when it is an equilibrium. In turn,
only a minority plays always-defect, always-cooperate, Grim, tit-for-tat, or similar
strategies when the Semi-Grim MPE exists.
Combined, this shows that Semi-Grim is predictive at both, the aggregate level
and the individual level, and since it is the Markov perfect equilibrium correspond-
ing to the BOS axioms, this explains their predictiveness. I also show that the
“no-reciprocity” condition σcd = σdc underlying Semi-Grim equally follows from
“Markov logit equilibrium”, i.e. by requiring robustness with respect to random util-
ity perturbations in the sense of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), which lends fur-
ther validity to this deviation from TFT. Finally, I identify two kinds of Semi-Grim
equilibria, namely a regular one, which admits purification (Bhaskar et al., 2008;
Doraszelski and Escobar, 2010), and a fully mixed one, which is included in the
belief-free equilibria constructed by Ely and Välimäki (2002). Belief-free equilibria
have received much attention in the recent theoretical literature (Ely et al., 2005;
Hörner and Olszewski, 2006; Hörner and Lovo, 2009; Fudenberg and Yamamoto,
2010; Kandori, 2011), as they are robust to private monitoring, such as the possi-
bility that the opponent forgets the current state. Thus, both kinds of Semi-Grim
equilibria are normatively plausible, which seems to explain their joint occurrence
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in the four considered experiments.
Implications of these results are discussed in Section 6. Aside from this, Section
2 introduces notation and basic definitions, Section 3 reviews belief-free equilibria,
Section 4 theoretically analyzes Semi-Grim equilibria, and Section 5 estimates the
individual strategies in recent experiments. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Preliminary remarks
Notation The players are denoted as i, j ∈ N = {1,2}. They play an infinitely
repeated Prisoner’s dilemma (PD) as defined in Figure 1a. Any such PD can be
transformed into the “standardized” form Figure 1b, and the best-known examples of
PDs are even “simple” in the sense of Figure 1c, with a= 2 or a= 3. These particular
PDs are simple, as (i) playing (c,c) is socially efficient (i.e. it maximizes the sum
of payoffs), and (ii) the gain from defecting in response to a cooperating opponent
exactly offsets the loss when cooperating in response to a defecting opponent (which
simplifies many algebraic expressions on repeated PDs).
The set of actions of the constituent game is S = {c,d}, and the set of states of
the repeated game is S× S. A Markov strategy σ ∈ [0,1]S×S maps each state to a
probability of choosing c in that state.2 For example, σs′,s′′ denotes the probability
that the respective player cooperates conditional on s′ ∈ S being his previous action
and s′′ ∈ S being his opponent’s previous action. I focus on strategy profiles that are
symmetric between players, and those will be denoted as (σ,σ). This assumption is
standard in analyses of experimental data, and it allows me to drop the player index
in denoting strategies. Note the implied inversion of indices, however, i.e. if player
i cooperates with probability σs′,s′′ in state (s′,s′′), then his opponent j 6= i considers
the same state to be (s′′,s′) and thus cooperates with probability σs′′,s′ .
2Such strategies are also known as 1-memory strategies (Barlo et al., 2009) and are special cases
of strategies with bounded recall (Sabourian, 1998). Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) show that choices
other than the previous ones (i.e. lag 2 and higher) are often insignificant, although they are not
entirely irrelevant.
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Figure 1: Prisoner’s dilemma (PD) games (with pdc > pcc > pdd > pcd and b > a >
1)
(a) The “General” PD
c d
c pcc, pcc pcd , pdc
d pdc, pcd pdd , pdd
(b) “Standardized” PD
c d
c a,a 0,b
d b,0 1,1
(c) The “Simple” PD
c d
c a,a 0,a+1
d a+1,0 1,1
Payoffs and equilibria Given strategy profile (σ,σ), the expected payoff of choos-
ing c in state (s′,s′′)∈ S×S is denoted as pis′,s′′(c), the expected payoff of choosing d
is denoted as pis′,s′′(d), and the expected payoff overall is pis′,s′′ in state (s′,s′′). These
payoffs satisfy, for all (s′,s′′) ∈ S×S,
pis′,s′′ = σs′,s′′ ·pis′,s′′(c)+(1−σs′,s′′) ·pis′,s′′(d) (1)
pis′,s′′(c) = σs′′,s′ ·
(
δpicc+(1−δ) pcc
)
+(1−σs′′,s′) ·
(
δpicd +(1−δ) pcd
)
(2)
pis′,s′′(d) = σs′′,s′ ·
(
δpidc+(1−δ) pdc
)
+(1−σs′′,s′) ·
(
δpidd +(1−δ) pdd
)
. (3)
Solving the Equation system (1)–(3) for (pis′,s′′) over all states yields the expected
payoffs as functions of σ. This is algebraically straightforward, but the resulting
expressions are fairly cumbersome (see e.g. Lemma A.1 in the appendix for the
respective solutions of simple PDs). Finally, a strategy profile (σ,σ) is a Markov
perfect equilibrium (MPE) if for all (s′,s′′) ∈ S×S,
σs′,s′′ > 0 ⇒ pis′,s′′(c)≥ pis′,s′′(d) and σs′,s′′ < 1 ⇒ pis′,s′′(c)≤ pis′,s′′(d).
(4)
Figure 2 reviews the three well-known pure MPEs that may exist in repeated
PDs. The always-defect MPE exists in general. The Grim MPE (σcc,σcd,σdc,σdd)=
(1,0,0,0) exists if
pcc ≥ (1−δ) pdc+δ pdd ⇔ δ≥ pdc− pccpdc− pdd =: δGrim. (5)
An equilibrium sustaining (at least) temporary cooperation along the path of play
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Figure 2: Pure Markov perfect equilibria
(a) Always defect
c,c
d,c
c,d
d,d
(b) Grim
c,c
d,c
c,d
d,d
(c) Perfect TFT
c,c
d,c
c,d
d,d
exists if and only if the Grim equilibrium exists. Thus, the condition δ ≥ δGrim is
theoretically necessary for cooperation to be sustained in equilibrium. Since always-
defect is an equilibrium in general, δ> δGrim is not theoretically sufficient.
A threshold for “sufficient” patience Roth and Murnighan (1978) show that co-
operation increases if Grim and PTFT equilibria exist, and Murnighan and Roth
(1983) as well as Dal Bo (2005) confirm that the discount rate is of major relevance
with respect to the emergence of cooperative play. Applied research therefore of-
ten assumes that players select cooperative equilibria if δ exceeds a given threshold,
usually the threshold for existence of Grim (see Blonski et al., 2011, for further
discussion). Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011) and Blonski et al. (2011, BOS) specifi-
cally designed experiments to test the hypothesis that existence of Grim equilibrium
is sufficient in practice. They found that it is not sufficient, while the cooperation
rate can be predicted well based on the discount factor’s relation to a higher thresh-
old characterized axiomatically by BOS. To review the BOS axioms, let the tuple
〈pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd,δ〉 denote a repeated “general” PD, let Γ denote the set of repeated
PDs, and let Γc⊂Γ denote the subset of repeated PDs where players “likely” cooper-
ate. BOS characterize Γc through three “parsimonious” axioms, which they argue to
be generally plausible, and two “comprehensive” axioms, which ensure uniqueness
of the selection criterion, i.e. of the implied δ-threshold.
Definition 2.1 (BOS axioms). Γc satisfies all of the following conditions.
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A1 (Positive linear payoff transformation invariance). For all τ(x)=αx+β, α>
0, 〈pcd, pdc, pcc, pdd,δ〉 ∈ Γc implies 〈τ(pcd),τ(pdc),τ(pcc),τ(pdd),δ〉 ∈ Γc.
A2 (δ-monotonicity). If pdc > pcc > pdd > pcd and pdc+ pcd < 2 pcc, then there
exists δ?(pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd)∈ (0,1] such that for all δ′: 〈pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd,δ′〉 ∈
Γc ⇔ δ′ > δ?(pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd).
A3 (Boundary conditions). pcd→−∞ ⇒ δ?(pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd)→ 1 and pcd→
pdd ⇒ δ?(pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd)→ (pdc− pcc)/(pdc− pdd).
A4 (Incentive independence). There exists an additively separable function µ(x1,x2,x3)
such that 〈pcd, pdc, pcc, pdd,δ〉 ∈ Γc iff µ(pcc− pdd, pdc− pcc, pdd− pcd)≥ 0.
A5 (Equal weight). 〈pcd, pdc, pcc, pdd,δ〉 ∈Γc if and only if
〈
p′cd, p
′
dd, pcc, pdd,δ
〉∈
Γc with pdc− pcc = pdd− p′cd and p′dd− pcc = pdd− pcd .
Proposition 2.2 (BOS, Proposition 2). If Γc satisfies A1–A5 from Definition 2.1,
then
〈pcd, pdc, pcc, pdd,δ〉 ∈ Γc ⇔ δ≥ pdc+ pdd− pcd− pccpdc− pcd =: δBOS. (6)
For a comprehensive discussion of these axioms, let me refer to Blonski et al.
(2011). Briefly, the first two axioms require invariance with respect to linear payoff
transformations (A1) and that more patient players are not less likely to cooperate
(A2), which implies that the selection criterion can be characterized by a δ-threshold.
A3 requires that players stop cooperating if the risk gets high (pcd →−∞) and that
they always cooperate if there is no risk (pcd → pdd), conditional on the existence
of Grim equilibria. The other two axioms ensure uniqueness of the δ-threshold by
restricting the relevance of the long-run gains from cooperation (pcc− pdd), in re-
lation to that of the short-run gains from defection (pdc− pcc) and to the risk of
cooperation (pdd− pcd). A4 requires additive separability of the selection criterion
with respect to these incentives, and A5 requires equality of the implied weights of
the two short-run incentives. The δ-thresholds from existence of Grim and PTFT
satisfy A4 but not A5.
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The axioms do not bear an obvious relation to a strategy or an equilibrium con-
cept. In this way, they differ from other axiomatic theories of equilibrium selection,
such as Govindan and Wilson (2006, 2012). As established below, requiring A1−A5
is equivalent to requiring existence of belief-free Semi-Grim MPEs, i.e. of equilibria
corresponding with the observations in Table 1.
3 Belief-free equilibria in relation to the BOS axioms
Given strategy profile (σ,σ), define the cooperation incentive in state (s′,s′′)∈ S×S
to be the difference of expected payoffs from one-time cooperation and one-time
defection p˜is′,s′′ := pis′,s′′(c)−pis′,s′′(d), with continuation play evolving according to
σ. The player is strictly best off cooperating in state (s′,s′′) if p˜is′,s′′ > 0, he is best off
defecting if p˜is′,s′′ < 0, and he randomizes only if p˜is′,s′′ = 0. In “simple” repeated PDs
(Figure 1c), the differences of the cooperation incentives in the four states satisfy
p˜icc− p˜icd = (σdc−σcc) ·µ p˜icc− p˜idc = (σcd−σcc) ·µ (7)
p˜icc− p˜idd = (σdd−σcc) ·µ p˜icd− p˜idc = (σcd−σdc) ·µ (8)
with µ = δ(1−δ)(a−1)(σdc+σcd−σcc−σdd)/r and r > 0. Thus, if µ = 0, i.e. if
σdc+σcd = σcc+σdd in simple PDs, then p˜icc = p˜icd = p˜idc = p˜idd . If p˜icc = 0 holds
in addition, the underlying strategy profile (σ,σ) is a fully mixed MPE, i.e. an MPE
where players are indifferent in all states. These are the “robust” equilibria derived
by Ely and Välimäki (2002). As players are always indifferent, their best responses
are independent of their beliefs about the opponent’s history (in case the history
is not common knowledge, i.e. under private monitoring). Hence, such belief-free
MPEs (Ely et al., 2005) are robust to private monitoring, which is not the case for
strict MPEs (Kandori, 2002). I refer to these equilibria also as belief-free MPEs, al-
though the repeated game considered here is theoretically one of perfect monitoring
(the subjects in the experiments may disagree, of course).
Solving Eqs. (7)–(8) for σcd,σdc yields a two-dimensional manifold of MPEs
(as previously observed by Bhaskar et al., 2008). Proposition 3.1 derives these equi-
librium strategies and their existence conditions for standardized PDs. It refines the
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results of Ely and Välimäki (2002) and Bhaskar et al. (2008), who characterize strat-
egy and existence condition implicitly, in relation to the terms picc and picd defined in
Eq. (1). Proposition 3.1 eliminates these endogenous entities, which will allow us to
relate the existence condition to the BOS criterion.
Proposition 3.1. In any standardized PD with 1/δ< a< b< (a−δ)/(1−δ), a two-
dimensional manifold of belief-free MPEs exists. It consists of all strategy profiles
(σ,σ) satisfying
σcd =
(a−b) δσdd +(b−1) δσcc+a−b
(a−1) δ , σdc =
aδσdd−δσcc+1
(a−1) δ . (9)
All MPEs that are not belief-free in the above sense are locally isolated, and
hence they are regular and finitely many (Doraszelski and Escobar, 2010). Thus,
almost all MPEs are belief-free (if the latter exist). Now, their existence condition
1/δ< a < b < (a−δ)/(1−δ) can be alternatively expressed as
δ≥min
{
1
a
,
b−a
b−1
}
⇔ δ≥min
{
pdd− pcd
pcc− pcd ,
pdc− pcc
pdc− pdd
}
=: δBF-MPE.
(10)
This condition satisfies the “parsimonious” BOS axioms A1,A2,A3, but it violates
A4, since the minimum function is not additively separable, and as can be verified
easily, it also violates weight equality A5. Thus, requiring existence of belief-free
MPEs violates both comprehensive axioms of BOS, whereas existence of Grim or
PTFT violated only A4. The latter violation is comparably minor, though, as each
branch of the criterion in (10) is additively separable in the way it is required. Thus,
A4 holds locally for almost all games if the criterion was “existence of belief-free
MPEs”. Axiom A5, equality of weights of defection gains (pdc− pcc) and cooper-
ation risk (pdd − pcd), continues to be violated though, as for the Grim condition
δ ≥ δGrim. This violation is obvious in the latter case, since pcd is strategically ir-
relevant in Grim equilibria, and the violation obtains similarly in all equilibria with
strict cooperation in any state. Then, pcd is irrelevant in that state, and the implicit
weights of pdc− pcc and pdd− pcd cannot be equal. In belief-free equilibria, in turn,
players randomize in all states, i.e. all possible outcomes are relevant. Due to the
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asymmetry σcd 6= σdc, however, the implicit weights of “defection gains” and “co-
operation risks” still do not equate exactly. This will change in belief-free equilibria
where the two players are equally likely to cooperate in all states, as shown next.
4 Semi-Grim equilibria
I call a strategy “Semi-Grim” if it satisfies σcc > σcd = σdc > σdd , as observed in
most treatments in Table 1. First, I show that the central sub-condition σcd = σdc
follows from robustness to random utility perturbations. To be precise, conditional
on σcc > 0.5 > σdd , logit equilibrium implies σcd = σdc. Logit equilibrium is a
special case of quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) and ex-
tends to dynamic games as “Markov logit equilibrium” (as defined in Breitmoser
et al., 2010). Logit equilibrium has been shown to explain experimental observations
in many circumstances, including the centipede game (Fey et al., 1996), traveler’s
dilemma (Capra et al., 1999), auctions (Goeree et al., 2002b), public goods games
(Goeree et al., 2002a), monotone contribution games (Choi et al., 2008), and beauty
contests (Breitmoser, 2012). Thus, it is a plausible starting point for explaining be-
havior also in repeated games. Formally, a strategy profile (σ,σ) is a Markov logit
equilibrium (MLE) if there exists λ ∈ R+ such that for all (s′,s′′) ∈ S×S,
σs′,s′′ =
exp{λ ·pis′,s′′(c)}
exp{λ ·pis′,s′′(c)}+ exp{λ ·pis′,s′′(d)}
. (11)
Rearranging Eq. (11) yields the alternative expression log
(
(1− σs′,s′′)/σs′,s′′
)
=
λ · (pis′,s′′(d)−pis′,s′′(c)). Thus, in MLE, differing cooperation rates, e.g. σcc > σdd ,
require corresponding differences in cooperation incentives, e.g. p˜icc > p˜idd . To es-
tablish the aforementioned claim on MLEs, it therefore suffices to show that p˜icc 6=
p˜idd and p˜icd 6= p˜idc cannot be satisfied simultaneously. The following proposition
does that, and thus the general observation σcc > 0.5 > σdd theoretically implies
σdc = σcd (as observed). In addition, it shows that the alternative class of “alternat-
ing” equilibria σdc 6= σcd require σdc > σcc. As σdc > σcc has never been observed
in experiments, I therefore conclude that logit equilibrium implies σdc = σcd .
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Proposition 4.1. Let (σ,σ) be an MLE of a repeated PD with max{σcc,σcd,σdc,σdd}>
0.5. Then,
1. σcd 6= σdc implies σcd < σcc = σdd < σdc ,
2. σcc 6= σdd implies σcd = σdc < σcc .
With the additional restriction σcd = σdc, the two-dimensional manifold of
belief-free MPEs reduces to a one-dimensional manifold of belief-free Semi-Grim
MPEs satisfying 0 < σdd < σdc = σcd < σcc < 1. The next proposition establishes
that belief-free Semi-Grim MPEs exist if and only if the BOS axioms are satisfied
(for comparability with BOS, the result is established for repeated “general” PDs).
Proposition 4.2. In any repeated “general” PD, a one-dimensional manifold of
belief-free Semi-Grim MPEs exists iff δ > δBOS. It consists of all strategy profiles
(σ,σ) satisfying
σdd =
(pdc− pcd) δ σcc− pdd− pdc+ pcd + pcc
δ(pdc− pcd) , (12)
σdc = σcd =
(pdc− pcd)δ σcc− pdc+ pcc
δ (pdc− pcd) . (13)
Eqs. (12), (13) yield a strategy profile (i.e. probabilities) if σcc≥ δBOS/δ. At the
threshold δ= δBOS, a mixed Semi-Grim MPE satisfying σcc = 1, σcd = σdc ∈ (0,1),
and σdd = 0 appears, and considering the average behavior reviewed in Table 1, this
seems to relate closely to the Markov strategy played by the cooperating players.
This will be verified in detail in the next section.
Bhaskar et al. (2008) argue that robustness to imperfect monitoring (i.e. being
belief-free) may not be the only plausible criterion for equilibrium selection. If a
mixed equilibrium does not admit purification, then there is no reason why players
should randomize in the specific way σcc > σdc = σcd > σdd prescribed by the equi-
librium. After all, the players are indifferent in all states. The standard argument
justifying the mixed equilibrium is based on purification, but Bhaskar et al. show
that the belief-free equilibria constructed above do not admit purification (in Markov
strategies with one-period memory). In turn, Doraszelski and Escobar (2010) show
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that locally isolated MPEs satisfy a regularity condition that implies purifiability in
Markov strategies.
Next, I show that (and when) such a regular Semi-Grim MPE (σ,σ) exists, i.e.
an MPE satisfying σcc = 1, σcd = σdc ∈ (0,1), σdd = 0 and inducing strict coop-
eration incentives p˜icc > 0 and p˜idd < 0 in the states (c,c) and (d,d). The strictness
of these constraints implies local isolation, and thus regularity and purifiability (Do-
raszelski and Escobar, 2010). Regular Semi-Grim exists under the same conditions
as belief-free Semi-Grim equilibrium if pdc + pcd ≥ pcc + pdd and under slightly
weaker conditions otherwise.
Proposition 4.3. A regular Semi-Grim MPE exists for all δ > δBOS in general, and
if pcc+ pdd > pdc+ pcd , then also for all
δ> 1−
√
2
√
pcc−pcd
√
pdc−pcc
√
pdd−pcd
√
pdc−pdd+(pdc+pcd−2 pcc) pdd+(pcc−2 pcd) pdc+pcc pcd
pdc− pcd .
(14)
The case pdc + pcd ≥ pcc + pdd is particularly illustrative. If δ = δBOS, the
aforementioned equilibrium σcc = 1, σcd = σdc ∈ (0,1), and σdd = 0 exists, then
with p˜icc = p˜idd = 0. As δ increases, the belief-free MPE inducing p˜icc = p˜idd = 0
moves into the interior of the strategy space, while the corner solution turns into
the strict, regular Semi-Grim MPE. If pdc+ pcd < pcc+ pdd , in turn, the gains from
short-term defections are comparably low, and in this case, regular Semi-Grim MPEs
exist under weaker conditions than belief-free Semi-Grim MPEs. The correspond-
ing existence condition (14) clearly violates axiom A4, additive separability of the
incentives, but interestingly, it also violates axiom A5, weight equality, despite the
symmetry condition σs′,s′′ = σs′′,s′ for all s′,s′′. The reason is the same as with Grim.
Since players are strictly best off cooperating in state (c,c), the payoff pcd is irrele-
vant there, and hence pdc− pcc and pdd− pcd do not have equal weight overall.
Finally, note that the set of belief-free Semi-Grim MPEs characterized in Prop.
4.2 and the regular Semi-Grim MPE characterized in Prop. 4.3 are the only Semi-
Grim MPEs, i.e. the only MPEs with the structure σcc > σcd = σdc > σdd . For, any
other MPE with this structure would require randomization in state (c,c) or (d,d),
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with µ 6= 0 in Eqs. (7), (8) to separate it from belief-free MPEs. For example, assume
there exists an MPE with σcc = 1 > σcd = σdc > σdd > 0. This requires p˜icd =
p˜idc = p˜idd , and by µ 6= 0 in Eqs. (7), (8), this implies σcd = σdc = σdd , contradicting
σdc > σdd . Similar contradictions obtain in the other two cases, and thus, the set of
Semi-Grim MPEs has been characterized completely.
5 Estimation of individual strategies
Table 1 shows that the average strategy is Semi-Grim in most treatments, and the
previous section has shown that existence of the (belief-free) Semi-Grim MPE is
equivalent to the predictive BOS criterion. Next, I show that the majority of in-
dividual subjects indeed uses Semi-Grim strategies when the respective equilibria
exist. This establishes that the average behavior in Table 1 is not a weighted sum of
entirely unrelated strategies, but of Semi-Grim strategies as claimed.
The econometric approach and the considered strategies closely follows Dal Bo
and Fréchette (2011). The considered strategies are always-defect, always-cooperate,
Grim, TFT, and a reciprocal strategy with prolonged punishment (σcc,σcd,σdc,σdd)=
(1,0,0,0.5). The latter strategy is a Markov variant of the T2 strategy considered
by Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011), and it it is a weakened version of perfect TFT
(1,0,0,1), which is theoretically plausible3 but in its strict form not identified in the
data (see Dal Bo and Fréchette, 2011, and Fudenberg et al., 2012). In addition, I
consider regular Semi-Grim and belief-free Semi-Grim (of the linear continuum of
belief-free Semi-Grim MPEs, the median one is taken).
Econometric model
Similarly to Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011), we have to account for noise in the analy-
sis. I assume that subjects of a given type play their equilibrium action with proba-
bility 1− γ, γ ∈ (0,1), and that they randomize uniformly with probability γ (in each
3PTFT is theoretically more effective than TFT if most subjects play cooperative strategies
(Nowak et al., 1993) and (Imhof et al., 2007), as original TFT struggles to restore cooperation af-
ter unilateral defection. PTFT is also called “win-stay, lose-shift”.
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round, taking independent draws). This approach estimates the same population
weights as Dal Bo and Fréchette’s approach if only pure equilibria are considered,
and it generalizes their approach straightforwardly to mixed MPEs. Econometri-
cally, the population is described as a mixture of a finite set K of components, where
for all k ∈K, members of component k cooperate with (perturbed) probability σω(k)
in state ω and they have weight ρ(k) in the population. Using os,t ∈ {0,1} and
ωs,t = { /0,cc,cd,dc,dd} to denote choice and state of the decision number t of sub-
ject s ∈ S, where os,t = 1 denotes cooperation and os,t = 0 denotes defection, the
log-likelihood of the model is
LL =∑
s∈S
log ∑
k∈K
∏
t
(
σωs,t (k)
)os,t · (1−σωs,t (k))1−os,t . (15)
The likelihood is maximized jointly over all parameters using the robust, gradient-
free NEWUOA algorithm (Powell, 2006), and convergence has been verified using
a Newton-Raphson algorithm. Thus, standard errors can be taken from the informa-
tion matrix (McLachlan and Peel, 2000). I consider all four experiments reviewed
in Table 1, but in the case of Fudenberg et al. (2012), I focus on the “standard”
treatment without exogenous noise (as equilibrium predictions are not available oth-
erwise). In all cases, I use the observations from the second halves of the experi-
ments, i.e. when individual behavior has largely stabilized, which follows Dal Bo
and Fréchette (2011) and Fudenberg et al. (2012).
The set of relevant strategies (i.e. the model dimension) is estimated as follows.
First, I eliminate all components with equilibria that do not exist, and similarly, I
eliminate the non-equilibrium strategies Always-Coop, TFT, T05 if Grim is not an
equilibrium. Second, I eliminate components with insignificant weights. Here I
use the conservative “BIC criterion” and eliminate a component if its elimination
does not increase BIC = −LL+ logn ·D/2 (with n as number of subjects and D as
number of parameters). In our case, this seems sufficient, as it leaves us with just
2-4 components in most cases. In general, alternative approaches may suggest the
elimination of further components (Biernacki et al., 2000).
Finally, actions in round 1 are not prescribed uniquely in MPEs and there usu-
ally are three possible equilibria for round-1 behavior. The standard assumption is
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that players treat the initial state equivalently to the way they treat (c,c), but I intend
to estimate the weights of the various MPEs without testing the joint assumption on
MPE and round-1 behavior. For this reason, I allow that all players may either be
“cautious”, and cooperate with a maximal probability of σ /0 in round 1, or not cau-
tious, and cooperate with probability σcc in round 1. Regardless of whether they are
cautious in round 1 or not, all players are assumed to play their (perturbed) equilib-
rium strategies in all subsequent rounds. Both σ /0 and the weight ρCaut of cautious
players are estimated from the data.
Results
Table 2 presents the estimated strategy weights for the four experiments discussed
before, and supplementing it, Table 3 shows which equilibria exist in the various
treatments and how the Semi-Grim predictions relate to the respective choices of the
average “cooperating” subject, i.e. to the subjects with σˆcc > 0.25. The remaining
subjects (i.e. those with σˆcc ≤ 0.25) usually play always-defect, i.e. their relation
to Semi-Grim is irrelevant. The equilibrium predictions for the remaining states σcc
and σdd are equal or close to 1 and 0 (respectively) in all cases, which is as observed.
The main observations can be summarized first; their discussion follows.
Result 5.1. If Semi-Grim equilibria exist, then the majority of subjects plays Semi-
Grim. Otherwise, the majority plays Always-defect or Grim. The reciprocal strate-
gies TFT and T05 are assigned to minorities in either case: to 10%–20% of the
subjects if Semi-Grim equilibria exist, and to 20%–40% if not.
Thus, the results clearly support the hypothesis that the majority of subjects
plays Semi-Grim, which followed from Table 1. Most importantly, the inclina-
tion to play Semi-Grim actually increases as the overall inclination to cooperate
increases. To see this, look at the four treatments where subjects cooperate most
consistently in state (c,c), i.e. at the treatments where the share of “cooperating sub-
jects” (σˆcc > 0.25) is at least 80%. By Table 3, these are the treatments DF4, DF6,
DO, and FRD. In three of these four treatments, more than 80% of the subjects play
Semi-Grim, i.e. regular or belief-free Semi-Grim. In the remaining treatments, be-
tween 47% and 73% of the subjects play Semi-Grim if it exists, i.e. the majority
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Table 2: Weights of the various strategies in the four experiments
(a) Duffy and Ochs (2009)
A-Def A-Coop Grim BF-SG Reg-SG TFT T05 γ σ /0 ρCaut LL
− − − 0.5
(0.07)
0.39
(0.08)
0.11
(−)
− 0.01
(0)
0.1
(0.04)
0.29
(0.06)
−946.3
(b) Fudenberg et al. (2012), treatment 6 (“no noise”)
A-Def A-Coop Grim BF-SG Reg-SG TFT T05 γ σ /0 ρCaut LL
− 0.2
(0.07)
− 0.24
(0.06)
0.37
(0.08)
0.19
(−)
− 0.01
(0)
0.06
(0.05)
0.17
(0.06)
−429.1
(c) Blonski et al. (2011)
Treat A-Def A-Coop Grim BF-SG Reg-SG TFT T05 γ σ /0 ρCaut LL
Agg 0.29
(0.03)
0
(0)
0.15
(0.03)
0.21
(0.04)
0.23
(0.04)
0.11
(0.02)
0.01
(−)
0.03
(0)
0.33
(0.02)
0.6
(0.04)
−3115.9
1 0.31
(0.08)
0.03
(0.02)
0.14
(0.07)
0.52
(−)
− − − 0.01
(0)
0.17
(0.04)
0.55
(0.1)
−412.2
2 − − 0.7
(0.13)
− − 0.3
(−)
− 0.01
(0)
0.02
(0.01)
0.97
(0.02)
−115
3 1
(−)
− − − − − − 0.14
(0.02)
1.21
(NaN)
0.51
(NaN)
−168.6
4 0.54
(0.07)
− 0.24
(0.07)
− − 0.18
(0.06)
0.03
(−)
0.04
(0.01)
0.37
(0.04)
0.81
(0.08)
−542.1
5 0.29
(0.09)
− − 0.29
(0.1)
0.3
(0.12)
0.12
(−)
− 0.01
(0.01)
0.27
(0.06)
0.59
(0.1)
−368.9
6 0.8
(0.09)
− 0.2
(−)
− − − − 0.02
(0.01)
0.57
(0.17)
0.63
(0.33)
−53.3
7 − − 0.46
(0.12)
− 0.54
(−)
− − 0.01
(0)
0.04
(0.01)
0.88
(0.05)
−161.1
8 0.4
(0.09)
− − 0.04
(0.04)
0.56
(−)
− − 0.02
(0)
0.38
(0.07)
0.66
(0.11)
−278.7
9 0.22
(0.07)
− 0.31
(0.11)
0.11
(0.08)
0.36
(−)
− − 0.02
(0.01)
0.4
(0.05)
0.49
(0.09)
−359
10 0.17
(0.06)
− − 0.25
(0.1)
0.48
(0.1)
0.1
(−)
− 0.05
(0.01)
0.5
(0.05)
0.52
(0.1)
−516.6
(d) Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)
Treat A-Def A-Coop Grim BF-SG Reg-SG TFT T05 γ σ /0 ρCaut LL
Agg 0.14
(0.03)
0.03
(0.02)
0.14
(0.04)
0.2
(0.04)
0.17
(0.06)
0.24
(0.04)
0.07
(−)
0.08
(0)
0.33
(0.01)
0.49
(0.04)
−9435.8
1 1
(−)
− − − − − − 0.1
(0)
0.35
(NaN)
0.5
(NaN)
−1412.7
2 0.47
(0.08)
− 0.15
(0.07)
− − 0.38
(−)
− 0.09
(0)
0.32
(0.02)
0.83
(0.08)
−1530.4
3 0.45
(0.07)
− 0.17
(0.06)
− − 0.25
(0.07)
0.12
(−)
0.08
(0.01)
0.29
(0.01)
0.96
(0.04)
−2216.8
4 0.08
(0.04)
− − 0.87
(0.06)
− − 0.06
(−)
0.01
(0)
0.18
(0.02)
0.2
(0.07)
−1112.8
5 0.35
(0.07)
− − 0.41
(0.08)
0.11
(0.06)
0.13
(−)
− 0.03
(0)
0.37
(0.02)
0.58
(0.09)
−1953.4
6 − − − 0.1
(0.05)
0.75
(0.09)
− 0.15
(−)
0.03
(0)
0.7
(0.03)
0.39
(0.09)
−1008.2
Legend: “A-Def” is Always-Defect (σcc,σcd ,σdc,σdd) = (0,0,0,0), “A-Coop” is Always-Cooperate
(1,1,1,1), Grim is (1,0,0,0), “BF-SG” is belief-free Semi-Grim ≈ (0.9,0.5,0.5,0.1) (depending on
treatment parameters, see also Prop. 4.2), “Reg-SG” is regular Semi-Grim ≈ (1,0.3,0.3,0) (depend-
ing on treatment parameters, see also Prop. 4.3), “TFT” is (1,0,1,0), and “T05” is a TFT strategy
with prolonged punishment (1,0,0,0.5). Subjects of a given type are assumed to play always-defect
if their strategy is not a best response to itself (i.e. if it is not an equilibrium).
γ is the noise parameter (probability of randomizing uniformly instead of playing the strategy),
ρCaut is the share of cautious players, and σ /0 is the probability of cooperation of cautious players in
round 1.
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Table 3: Behavior of the “cooperating” subjects (σˆcc > 0.25) in relation to the δ-thresholds in the various treatments
δ-thresholds Threshold met Behavior of “cooperators” Semi-Grim pred. σcd,dc
Treatment δ δGrim δBF-SG δReg-SG δGrim δBF-G δReg-SG Share σˆcc σˆdd σˆcd,dc Regular Belief-free
Blonski et al. (2011)
1 0.75 0.5 0.667 0.667 × × × 0.475 0.92 0.043 0.44 0.256 0.5
2 0.75 0.52 0.904 0.865 × 0.075 1 0.014 0.375 - -
3 0.5 0.667 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.917 0.024 0 - -
4 0.75 0.667 0.8 0.8 × 0.333 0.982 0.063 0.326 - -
5 0.875 0.667 0.8 0.8 × × × 0.525 0.993 0.046 0.449 0.228 0.5
6 0.5 0.326 0.797 0.741 × 0 0 0 0 - -
7 0.75 0.326 0.797 0.741 × × 0.2 0.977 0 0.424 0.667 -
8 0.875 0.326 0.797 0.741 × × × 0.4 0.98 0.017 0.455 0.329 0.843
9 0.75 0.429 0.667 0.661 × × × 0.7 0.956 0.017 0.201 0.299 0.611
10 0.75 0.455 0.572 0.572 × × × 0.725 0.903 0.04 0.201 0.132 0.405
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)
1 0.5 0.719 0.815 0.815 0.364 0.701 0.108 0.457 - -
2 0.75 0.719 0.815 0.815 × 0.682 0.755 0.082 0.48 - -
3 0.5 0.401 0.606 0.605 × 0.5 0.625 0.151 0.432 - -
4 0.75 0.401 0.606 0.605 × × × 0.921 0.927 0.161 0.492 0.214 0.553
5 0.5 0.078 0.394 0.343 × × × 0.696 0.832 0.129 0.429 0.333 0.789
6 0.75 0.078 0.394 0.343 × × × 1 0.943 0.146 0.34 0.137 0.693
Duffy and Ochs (2009)
0.9 0.5 0.667 0.667 × × × 0.929 0.969 0.127 0.351 0.094 0.5
Fudenberg et al. (2012), “no-noise” treatment
6 0.875 0.25 0.4 0.4 × × × 0.917 0.973 0.098 0.555 0.041 0.5
Note: The “δ-thresholds” refer to the minimal δ such that the respective equilibria exist (Grim, Belief-free Semi-Grim, Regular Semi-Grim), see Eqs.
(5), (6), (14). In addition, shares and average strategies of “cooperators” (subjects with σˆcc > 0.25) are provided, and the cooperation rates σdc = σcd
predicted by the two Semi-Grim equilibria.
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of subjects across all experiments. The strategies of the subjects not playing Semi-
Grim in these cases (i.e. when Semi-Grim exists) depend on the experiment. In
Fudenberg et al. (2012), they play heuristics such as Always-Cooperate or TFT, in
Blonski et al. (2011) they play Always-Defect or Grim, and in Dal Bo and Fréchette
(2011) they play Always-Defect or TFT/T05. Thus, the observation that most sub-
jects play Semi-Grim (when it is an equilibrium) is the only observation common to
all experiments, and it shows that the majority of subjects adapt Semi-Grim strate-
gies regardless of how the minority of “other players” behaves.
Finally, look at the strategies of subjects when Semi-Grim equilibria do not
exist. These are the strategies in the treatments BOS 2–4,6 and DF 1–3. In these
cases, the majority of subjects is classified as Always-Defect or Grim (note that the
weight of Semi-Grim is set to zero in the cases, as the mixed equilibrium strategies
cannot be computed if the equilibria do not exist). As Table 3 shows, in treatments
BOS 2,4 and DF 2,3, Grim equilibria exist, and the discount factor δ is about 0.1
below the threshold for existence of Semi-Grim. In these cases, the average cooper-
ating subject already plays Semi-Grim σcc > σcd,dc > σdd , with σˆcd,dc ∈ (0.3,0.5)
as reported in Table 3. These cooperation probabilities are similar to those in treat-
ments where Semi-Grim equilibria exist, which in turn are equal to the Semi-Grim
predictions in these cases, but due to non-existence of Semi-Grim equilibria, the
cooperating subjects are to be classified as playing Grim or TFT in these cases. Ar-
guably, these subjects actually play Semi-Grim ε-equilibria, which suggests that the
weights of Grim and TFT are overestimated in these cases. An evaluation of such
mixed ε-equilibria is left as further research, however.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposed a novel explanation of behavior in repeated Prisoner’s Dilem-
mas that fits both subjects’ strategies and the BOS criterion. Accordingly, subjects
play a mixed, non-reciprocal Semi-Grim strategy σcc > σdc ≈ σcd > σdd . This strat-
egy closely fits choices in four recent experiments, i.e. both average and individual
behavior in these experiments, and it relates closely to several recent developments
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in related literature: axiomatic equilibrium selection in repeated PDs (Blonski et al.,
2011), robustness to imperfect monitoring (Ely and Välimäki, 2002) and purifiabil-
ity (Doraszelski and Escobar, 2010), and Markov logit equilibrium (McKelvey and
Palfrey, 1995; Breitmoser et al., 2010). The results appear to be very robust, as the
majority of subjects plays Semi-Grim strategies whenever a Semi-Grim equilibrium
exists, and the weights of Semi-Grim strategies is actually the largest (above 80%) in
treatments where most subjects cooperate. These results further strengthen the ob-
servation that subjects’ behavior in repeated PDs seems to be predictable, following
Blonski et al. (2011) and Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011) who showed that the emer-
gence of cooperation is predictable. This positive result appears to be very promising
in relation to the embarrassment of riches implied by Folk theorems, suggesting that
substantial equilibrium selection actually takes place in repeated games.
At the same time, the analysis departs from the literature following Axelrod
(1980a,b), which focused on reciprocal strategies, i.e. Markov strategies satisfying
either σdc > σcd or σdd > σcd . The support for this department is fairly strong, as
perfect TFT is not played by subjects (see Dal Bo and Fréchette, 2011, Fudenberg
et al., 2012, and the weight of the T05 strategy in 2), and as TFT is played by few,
if any, subjects. For, if TFT would have substantial weight, then σdc 6= σcd should
be significant, since all otherwise discussed strategies (including Semi-Grim) imply
σdc = σcd .
Finally, this paper has been the first to consider usage of mixed strategies such as
Semi-Grim in econometric analyses of repeated PDs, and thus also the first to show
that subjects play belief-free equilibria. Hence, there is ample opportunity to extend
this research. In particular, it appears to be most interesting to see how predictive
non-reciprocal, mixed equilibria are with respect other repeated games. While the
concept of belief-free equilibria generalizes straightforwardly to other constituent
games, based on the results of Ely et al. (2005), a generalization of the no-reciprocity
condition σdc = σcd does not seem to be available immediately. This may be an
obstacle in such generalizations, but the observed relation to logit equilibrium may
be of help here. In light of the above results, however, further research along these
lines seems warranted.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1. In standardized PDs, it is cumbersome but straightforward
to verify that p˜is′,s′′ := pis′,s′′(c)−pis′,s′′(d) for all s′,s′′ ∈ S satisfy Eqs. (7)–(8) with
µ=
(1−δ) (δ (bσdd−σdc−σcd−bσcc+2σcc)−aδ (2σdd−σdc−σcd)+b−a−1)
1−δ(σ2dd−2σdd−2σcd σdc+σdc+σcd+σ2cc)
−δ2 (σdd−σcc)(σdcσdd+σcd σdd−2σccσdd−2σcd σdc+σccσdc+σccσcd)
.
Thus, µ = 0 implies p˜icc = p˜icd = p˜idc = p˜idd . Solving its enumerator for σdc yields
σdc =−(b−2a) δσdd +(a−1) δσcd +(2−b) δσcc+b−a−1
(a−1) δ (16)
and substituting this for σcd in p˜icc = 0, and straightforward but tedious algebraic
manipulations, yields σcd as claimed above. Substituting this for σcd in Eq. (16),
finally, this yields σdc as claimed above. Finally, the set of strategy profiles satisfying
these constraints is not empty if σcd > 0 and σdc < 1, while σcd < 1 and σdc > 0
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hold true in any standardized PD. At the critical point σcc = 1,σdd = 0, σdc < 1 is
equivalent to a > 1/δ and σcd > 0 is equivalent to b < (a−δ)/(1−δ).
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Recall p˜is′,s′′ as defined in Eqs. (7)–(8) and that log
[
(1−
σs′,s′′)/σs′,s′′
]
=−λp˜is′,s′′ in all (s′,s′′) if (σ,σ) is an MLE.
1. First, by p˜icd − p˜idc = (σcd−σdc) · µ, σdc 6= σcd implies µ > 0. For, µ = 0
implies p˜icd = p˜idc and thus σdc = σcd in MLE, while in case µ < 0, σcd ≷ σdc
implies p˜icd ≶ p˜idc and thus σcd ≶ σdc, a contradiction. Next, by µ > 0, σdc ≶
σcc implies p˜icc ≶ p˜icd and thus σcc ≶ σcd , and vice versa. Thus, either σcd <
σcc = σdd < σdc or σdc < σcc = σdd < σcd . It remains to show σcd < σdc. For
contradiction, assume σdc < σcc = σdd < σcd . If σcc = σdd , p˜icd is falling in
σcd and increasing in σdc, and in the limiting case σdc = σcc = σdd = σcd , it
evaluates to
p˜icd =−(d−1) (−bσcc+aσcc+σcc−1) .
Thus, p˜icd < 0, which implies σcd < 0.5 and thus contradicts the assumption
that max{σcc,σcd,σdc,σdd}> 0.5.
2. First, by p˜icc− p˜idd = (σdd−σcc) · µ, σcc 6= σdd implies µ < 0. For, µ = 0
implies σcc = σdd , and in case µ > 0, σcc ≷ σdd implies p˜icc ≶ p˜idd and thus
σcc ≶ σdd (contradiction). In turn, µ < 0 implies σcd = σdc, as σcd 6= σdc
implies µ > 0 by the argument made in point 1. It remains to show that σdc <
σcc, or equivalently p˜icc < p˜idc. Using σcd = σdc, p˜icc− p˜idc simplifies toward
p˜icc− p˜idc =
(d−1)(σdc−σcc)(d (bσdd−2aσdd+2aσdc−2σdc−bσcc+2σcc)+b−a−1)
d (σ2dd−2σdd−2σ2dc+2σdc+σ2cc)+2d2 (σdc−σcc)(σdd−σcc)(σdd−σdc)−1
.
For contradiction assume σdc ≥ σcc. The denominator of the fraction is gen-
erally decreasing in σdd , and in the limiting case σdd = 0 it is
2d (dσcc−1) σ2dc−2d
(
dσ2cc−1
)
σdc+dσ2cc−1 < 0.
Thus, it is generally negative. The numerator of the right-hand side is negative
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if
σdd <
(2a−2) dσdc+(2−b) dσcc+b−a−1
(2a−b) d =: σ˜dd.
Thus, in case σdd < σ˜dd , p˜icc− p˜idc is positive, contradicting the initial assump-
tion σcc < σdc. Alternatively, in case σdd ≥ σ˜dd , the cooperation incentive p˜idc
is decreasing in σdd , and in the limiting case σdd = σ˜dd ,
p˜idc =
(d−1) (bdσdc−bdσcc+b−a)
2dσdc−2dσcc+1 .
Thus, p˜idc < 0 follows if σdc > σcc. Since p˜idc < 0 also implies σdc < 0.5, this
contradicts max{σcc,σcd,σdc,σdd}> 0.5.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Eqs. (7)–(8) hold equivalently here, now with µ = r1/r2
where
r1 = δ (pdc+ pcd) (σdd−σcc)−2δ pcc (σdd−σdc)
−2δ pdd (σdc−σcc)− pdd + pdc+ pcd− pcc
and r2 6= 0. Thus, r1 = 0 again yields p˜icc = p˜icd = p˜idc = p˜idd . Solving r1 = 0 for σdc,
σdc =
2δ(pccσdd− pdd σcc)−δ (pdc+ pcd) (σdd−σcc)+ pdd− pdc− pcd + pcc
2δ(pcc− pdd) ,
and substituting this into p˜icc = 0 yields
δ2 (pdc− pcd) (σdd−σcc)−δ (pdc− pcd) (σdd−σcc−1)
+δ(pdd− pcc)− pdd− pdc+ pcd + pcc = 0.
Solving these two conditions for (σdd,σdc) yields Eqs. (12), (13). As for existence
of these MPEs, σdd ≥ 0 holds true (at σcc = 1) iff δ≥ (pdc+ pdd− pcd− pcc)/(pdc−
pcd), while σdd < σdc ≤ 1 is satisfied for all σcc ∈ [0,1].
Proof of Proposition 4.3. If σcc = 1, σcd = σdc, and σdd = 0, the cooperation incen-
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tive in state (d,c), p˜idc := pidc(c)− p˜idc(d), is
p˜idc =
δ(pdd+δ(pdc−pcd)−pdc+pcd−pcc)σ2dc−(δ2 (pdc−pcd)+2δ(pdd−pdc)+pdc+pcd−pdd−pcc)σdc−(1−δ)(pdd−pcd)
2δ (σdc−1) σdc+1 .
(17)
First, I show that the two conditions p˜icc > p˜idc and p˜idc = 0 imply that σ is a mixed
MPE. By σdc = σcd and Eq. (8), p˜idc = p˜icd , i.e. p˜idc = 0 implies p˜icd = 0. Further, by
p˜icc > p˜idc and Eqs. (7)–(8), σcc = 1 > σdc implies µ < 0, and by σdd = 0 < σdc this
implies p˜idd < p˜idc = 0. Hence, any strategy profile satisfying p˜icc > p˜idc = 0 (besides
σcc = 1,σdd = 0) is mixed MPE with the claimed incentive structure.
Second, I derive the existence condition. p˜idc = 0 obtains if
σdc =
(2δ−1) pdd +(1−δ)2 pdc+
(
1−δ2) pcd− pcc±√r
(2δ2−2δ) (pdc− pcd)−2δ(pcc− pdd) (18)
with
r=(pdd− pdc− pcd + pcc)2+4δ
(
(pdc+ pcd) pdd + pcc (pdc+ pcd−2 pdd)− p2dc− p2cd
)
−2δ2 ((pdc+ pcd) pdd + pcc (pdc+ pcd−2 pdd)−3 p2dc+4 pcd pdc−3 p2cd)
+δ4 (pdc− pcd)2−4δ3 (pdc− pcd)2
These strategy profiles exist if r ≥ 0, and solving r = 0 for δ, this yields the lower
bound claimed in Eq. (14). Now, evaluating p˜icc− p˜idc at σcc = 1, σcd = σdc, σdd = 0
yields
p˜icc− p˜idc =
(1−σdc)(δ(2 pdd σdc−2 pccσdc−2 pdd+pdc+pcd)+pdd−pdc−pcd+pcc)
2δ (σdc−1) σdc+1 (19)
and at the limiting strategy σdc
∣∣
r=0, it is positive if and only if
(d−1)2 (pdc− pcd) (pdd− pdc− pcd + pcc)
pcc− pdd +(1−δ) (pdc− pcd) > 0. (20)
This is satisfied if and only if pcc+ pdd > pdc+ pcd . Otherwise, the limiting strategy
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σdc does not solve r = 0. Instead, it solves p˜icc = p˜idc, which yields
σdc =
(2δ−1) pdd +(1−δ) pdc+(1−δ) pcd− pcc
2δ(pdd− pcc) . (21)
Substituting it into p˜idc = 0, and solving for δ yields δ> δBOS.
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Lemma A.1. If both players play strategy σ in a “simple” repeated PD, then the expected payoffs in the four states are
picc =
δ
(
aσcc σ2dd−σcc σ2dd+σ2dd−aσ2cc σdd+σ2cc σdd−aσdd−σdd−2aσcc σcd σdc+2σcc σcd σdc−2σcd σdc+aσ2cc σdc−σ2cc σdc+σdc+aσ2cc σcd−σ2cc σcd+σcd+σ2cc+aσcc−σcc
)
+aδ2
(
σdd−σcc
)(
σdc σdd+σcd σdd−2σcc σdd−2σcd σdc+σcc σdc+σcc σcd
)
−aσcc+σcc−1
δ
(
σ2dd−2σdd−2σcd σdc+σdc+σcd+σ2cc
)
+δ2
(
σdd−σcc
)(
σdc σdd+σcd σdd−2σcc σdd−2σcd σdc+σcc σdc+σcc σcd
)
−1
,
picd =
δ2
(
aσ2dc σ
2
dd−aσcc σdc σ2dd−σcc σdc σ2dd+σdc σ2dd−aσ2cd σ2dd+aσcc σcd σ2dd+σcc σcd σ2dd+aσcd σ2dd−aσcc σ2dd−σcc σ2dd−2aσcd σ2dc σdd+2aσ2cd σdc σdd−aσcd σdc σdd−σcd σdc σdd+aσ2cc σdc σdd+σ2cc σdc σdd−aσ2cc σcd σdd−σ2cc σcd σdd+
aσ2cc σdd+σ2cc σdd+2σcc σcd σ2dc+aσcd σ
2
dc−σcd σ2dc−σ2cc σ2dc−2σcc σ2cd σdc−aσ2cd σdc+σ2cd σdc+aσcc σcd σdc+σcc σcd σdc−aσ2cc σdc+σ2cc σ2cd−σ2cc σcd
)
+δ
(
aσdc σ2dd−σcd σ2dd+σ2dd−aσcd σdc σdd+σcd σdc σdd−aσdc σdd−σdc σdd+aσcd σdd+σcd σdd
−aσdd−σdd−aσcd σ2dc−σcd σ2dc+σ2dc+aσ2cd σdc+σ2cd σdc−aσcc σcd σdc+σcc σcd σdc−2σcd σdc+aσ2cc σdc+aσdc−σ2cd−σ2cc σcd+σcd+σ2cc
)
−aσdc+σcd−1(
δ
(
σdc−σcd
)
+1
)(
δ
(
σ2dd−2σdd−2σcd σdc+σdc+σcd+σ2cc
)
+δ2
(
σdd−σcc
)(
σdc σdd+σcd σdd−2σcc σdd−2σcd σdc+σcc σdc+σcc σcd
)
−1
) ,
pidc =
−δ2
(
σ2dc σ
2
dd−aσcc σdc σ2dd−σcc σdc σ2dd−aσdc σ2dd−2σdc σ2dd−σ2cd σ2dd+aσcc σcd σ2dd+σcc σcd σ2dd+σcd σ2dd+aσcc σ2dd+σcc σ2dd−2σcd σ2dc σdd+2σ2cd σdc σdd+aσcd σdc σdd+σcd σdc σdd+aσ2cc σdc σdd+σ2cc σdc σdd+2aσdc σdd+2σdc σdd
−aσ2cc σcd σdd−σ2cc σcd σdd−2aσcd σdd−2σcd σdd−aσ2cc σdd−σ2cc σdd+2aσcc σcd σ2dc+aσcd σ2dc+3σcd σ2dc−aσ2cc σ2dc−aσ2dc−σ2dc−2aσcc σ2cd σdc−aσ2cd σdc−3σ2cd σdc−aσcc σcd σdc−σcc σcd σdc−σ2cc σdc+aσ2cc σ2cd+aσ2cd+σ2cd+aσ2cc σcd+2σ2cc σcd
)
−δ
(
σdc σ2dd−aσcd σ2dd−σ2dd+aσcd σdc σdd−σcd σdc σdd−aσdc σdd−σdc σdd+aσcd σdd+σcd σdd+aσdd+σdd−aσcd σ2dc−σcd σ2dc+aσ2dc+aσ2cd σdc+σ2cd σdc+aσcc σcd σdc−σcc σcd σdc+2σcd σdc+σ2cc σdc+σdc−aσ2cd−aσ2cc σcd−aσcd−2σcd−σ2cc
)
+
(
a+1
)
δ3
(
σdc−σcd
)(
σdd−σcc
)(
σdc σdd+σcd σdd−2σcc σdd−2σcd σdc+σcc σdc+σcc σcd
)
+σdc−aσcd−1(
δ
(
σdc−σcd
)
+1
)(
δ
(
σ2dd−2σdd−2σcd σdc+σdc+σcd+σ2cc
)
+δ2
(
σdd−σcc
)(
σdc σdd+σcd σdd−2σcc σdd−2σcd σdc+σcc σdc+σcc σcd
)
−1
) ,
pidd =
δ
(
aσdc σ2dd−σdc σ2dd+aσcd σ2dd−σcd σ2dd−aσcc σ2dd+σcc σ2dd+σ2dd−2aσcd σdc σdd+2σcd σdc σdd+aσ2cc σdd−σ2cc σdd−2σdd−2σcd σdc+σdc+σcd+σ2cc
)
+δ2
(
σdd−σcc
)(
σdc σdd+σcd σdd−2σcc σdd−2σcd σdc+σcc σdc+σcc σcd
)
−aσdd+σdd−1
δ
(
σ2dd−2σdd−2σcd σdc+σdc+σcd+σ2cc
)
+δ2
(
σdd−σcc
)(
σdc σdd+σcd σdd−2σcc σdd−2σcd σdc+σcc σdc+σcc σcd
)
−1
Proof. These results follow straightforwardly from algebraic manipulations of Eqs. (1)-(3).
Lemma A.2. (σ,σ) is an MLE of a “simple” repeated PD if and only if log(1−σs′,s′′)/σs′,s′′ =−λpis′,s′′ for all s′,s′′ ∈ S, where
pis′,s′′ := pis′,s′′(c)−pis′,s′′(d) are
picc =
(
d−1)(−δ(bσ2dd −aσ2dd −2bσccσdd +aσccσdd +aσdd −bσ2dc +aσ2dc +σ2dc +2bσccσdc−2σccσdc−aσdc−aσ2cc +σ2cc)+aδ2 (σdc−σcc)(σdd −σcc)(σdd −σdc)+bσcc−aσcc +σcc−1)
δ
(
σ2dd −2σdd −2σ2dc +2σdc +σ2cc
)
+2δ2
(
σdc−σcc
)(
σdd −σcc
)(
σdd −σdc
)−1
pidc =
(
d−1)(−δ(bσ2dd −aσ2dd −2bσdcσdd +aσdcσdd +aσdd +bσ2dc +aσ2dc−σ2dc−aσccσdc +2σccσdc−aσdc−σ2cc)+aδ2 (σdc−σcc)(σdd −σcc)(σdd −σdc)+bσdc−aσdc +σdc−1)
δ
(
σ2dd −2σdd −2σ2dc +2σdc +σ2cc
)
+2δ2
(
σdc−σcc
)(
σdd −σcc
)(
σdd −σdc
)−1
pidd =
(
d−1)(δ(bσ2dd −2bσdcσdd +2σdcσdd +aσccσdd −2σccσdd −aσdd +bσ2dc−aσ2dc−σ2dc +aσdc +σ2cc)+aδ2 (σdc−σcc)(σdd −σcc)(σdd −σdc)+bσdd −aσdd +σdd −1)
δ
(
σ2dd −2σdd −2σ2dc +2σdc +σ2cc
)
+2δ2
(
σdc−σcc
)(
σdd −σcc
)(
σdd −σdc
)−1 .
Proof. σcd = σdc implies picd = pidc and the remainder follows from the definition Eq. (11), using Eq. (1) and Lemma A.1.
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